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The aim of this paper is to explore assertions of realism in public law.  Given the 
breadth of this goal it is proposed to confine the examination to one particular area of 







.  All three theorists assert that their explanation of 
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constitutionalism represents a form of reality.  Loughlin, for example, argues that his 
understanding of constitutional reality can be found in ‘the structure of beliefs that 
constitute the idea of public law’ along with the ‘set of ideas which we are obliged to 
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accept’ combined with the ‘basic concepts which are pre-supposed’ when we ‘speak 
and act in public law terms’.4  Loughlin observations are represented as a true account 
of ‘the character of actually existing constitutional arrangements’.5  Walker presents 
quite a different view of reality, one that consists of multiple constitutional authority 
formations and interpretations
6
 which are spread globally in ‘a complex and ever-
shifting mosaic of the new and the old, the emergent and the mature’.7  Unlike 
Loughlin and Walker, Allan is less concerned with representing the ‘big picture’ of 
the theory of constitutionalism.  For Allan constitutionalism is centred on judicial 
activism which is in turn based on a theory of the rule of law, derived from the 
common law tradition.  It is acknowledged that there are many other public lawyers 
who write on constitutionalism but, as illustrated above, Allan, Loughlin and 
Walker’s represent a diverse range of analyses on the topic.  This then raises the 
question: how can such diverse, possibly even incompatible analyses, all represent 
reality?  
In order to answer this question the paper will begin by considering how to 
test for realism in public law and then examine representations of realism in order to 
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identify key features of realism analysis.  The writings of Allan, Loughlin and Walker 
in relation to constitutionalism will then be explored with reference to the identified 
features.  The paper will conclude by offering a number of comments on realism and 
analysis in public law. 
 
The Testing of Realism within Public Law Analysis 
 
The assertion of realism is a feature to be found in all areas of academia thus making 
it one of the most common and possibly even the most overused terms to be found in 
scholarly discourse.  Simplistically, realism refers to the totality or completeness of 
all real things.  As a philosophical approach realism is about reality.  It is an approach 
that can be found in such diverse disciplines as law, sociology, literature, history, 
science, etc.  In addition to the contextual placement of realism there is also the matter 
of varieties of realism along with levels and dimensions of realism to consider.  
Given the wide range of assertions, characteristics and definitions to be found 
in respect of realism it is proposed to focus on two specific forms of realism, that of 
legal realism and scientific realism.  The reasons for the selection of these particular 
forms of realism are as follows.  Legal realism is a school of thought within 
jurisprudence and is generally regarded as a key topic within a jurisprudence course.  
A fact evidenced by its inclusion in many key/core textbooks available for the study 
of jurisprudence at undergraduate level.  This would indicate that there should be 
some discoverable commonality between realism-claiming assertions within law in 
general and assertions of realism within a particular domain of law, that of public law 
and thereby the theory of constitutionalism.  Conversely, scientific realism is external 
to law and represents a body of knowledge that possesses limited attraction to 
 5 
lawyers.  This does not indicate that scientific analysis is unknown within legal 
analysis.  There is, for example, the application of theories of quantum mechanics and 
relativity to constitutional law
8
 along with the application of chaos theory to 
jurisprudence.
9
  More recently there has been the consideration of complexity theory
10
 
along with a general consideration of scientific methods as the basis for the study of 
law.
11
  These studies indicate that it is possible for lawyers to draw upon scientific 
analysis.  The use of scientific realism for the purposes of this paper is therefore 
acceptable.  It represents an approach that it is neither novel nor unique but just 
different, a facet which should not be excluded when testing any forms of analytical 
statement. 
Accordingly, it is proposed to juxtapose legal realism, a realm where there is a 
high expectation in terms of the discovery of common features, with scientific 
realism, a realm where there is a low expectation as to the discovery of shared 
features.  From such a juxtaposition it should be possible to identify features with 
sufficient strength of commonality from which to test statements of realism within 
public law.  Of course, it could be argued the juxtaposition represents a ‘mere 
contrivance’ and the resulting analysis is likely to lack vigour.  This criticism is 
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acknowledged but, given the absence of an explicit or even tentative premise from 
which to evaluate ‘realism’ within public law, it is countered that the approach 
represents sound methodology.  
 
Juxtaposing Legal Realism and Scientific Realism 
 
Before juxtaposing facets of legal realism with scientific realism, it is first necessary 
to offer a brief descriptive account of the two approaches.  Not only will this provide 
the reader with some understanding of these terms, legal realism and scientific 




Legal realism is an approach to legal analysis that seeks to abandon the metaphysical 
approach to law in favour of analysis that is premised on life and experience.  There 
are two identifiable schools of legal realism, the American and the Scandinavian.  For 
the purposes of this paper it is proposed to draw on the key themes outlined by the 
American school of legal realism.
12
  Within this school there is much diversity 
amongst those who claim to be ‘legal realists’ but it is possible to identify three key 
features.  These are the attack on formalism, the indeterminacy of law and legal 
instrumentalism.  
                                                 
12
  Although Scandinavian legal realism emerged at the same time as that of 
American legal realism its influence was limited.  The works of its key writers are 
rarely referenced or applied today even within Scandinavia.   
 7 
The attack on formalism relates to the limited material base from which legal 
analysis is conducted.  Sources, such as case law, form the basis from which legal 
principles and doctrines are ‘discovered’ much in the way that scientists discover their 
principles within the confines of a laboratory.
13
  Legal realists sought to challenge the 
scientific pretensions of ‘legal science’ where an argument is presented as is if the 
conclusion can be deductively induced from an indeterminate premise.  Legal realists 
argued that this classical approach, which is represented as ‘mechanical 
jurisprudence’,14 fails to take into consideration real life/world conditions or 
consequences.   
The indeterminacy of law is closely related to the attack on formalism.  Legal 
realists argue that judicial decisions are often determined by factors other than legal 
rules, principles or norms.  Judges ‘follow their instincts’ and make ‘sham references 
to rules of law’, are generally ‘unaware of what they are doing’ and persist in 
foolishly ‘believing ‘that they are being obedient to precedent’.15 
Legal instrumentalism is where the law is viewed as a tool to achieve certain social 
goals and balance competing interests within society.  Legal realists regard the role of 
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the judge as being to focus on the future social and economic consequences of their 




There are, of course, problems and criticisms of legal realism.  The problems 
relate to its decline as an approach to legal analysis after the Second World War, 
largely as a consequence of its cynical and nihilistic character.  Its censure of judges 
and law making did not fit comfortably in an era that sought to criminalise the past 
activities of fascism and incorporate the perceived threat of communism.
17
  Criticisms 
of legal realism relate to its perception as the nature of law and the role of the judge.  
Dworkin is highly critical of legal realism labelling its results orientated, policy based 
approach to judicial decision making as ‘pragmatism’.18  For Dworkin the law cannot 
be based on arbitrary distinctions as this would undermine the very meaning and 
purpose of the law.  Other criticisms relate to the absence of a coherent methodology 
and theoretical premise.  Posner, for example, argued that legal realists ‘gave 
empirical research rather a bad name amongst legal academies’ and that as a 
movement ‘it illustrated the futility of empirical investigation severed from a 
theoretical framework’.19   
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A further criticism, and one that is pertinent to this paper, is that legal realists 
draw heavily on commercial law and not constitutional law.  How then can such an 
approach be used to test assertions of realism in the context of public law?  This 
criticism was contested, most notably by Hale, who was derisive of the public-private 
distinction.
20
  Hale argued that it was the decisions of governments that created and 
structured the ‘private sphere’ even by way of its non-interference and therefore the 
division was an artefact of government.
21
  This view has been asserted as representing 
a non-sequitur.
22
  It is argued that it does not matter if there is a private realm or a 
public realm of law, what matters is the fact that a division exists.  If the underlying 
normative reasons for the division are sound then these provide sufficient reason for 
the absence of interference by governments in the private realm.
23
  It therefore 
follows that to dismiss the applicability of legal realism to constitutional analysis is 
also unsound since the normative reasons for the separation, however formally or 
informally the separation is determined, are part of the justification for the existence 
of both the private and public realm.  In other words, whilst the origins of legal 
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realism lie within the realm of private law, legal realism is also germane to the public 
realm, it is just a matter of its application. 
More recently the works of the legal realists have been reinterpreted by Leiter.  
Leiter argues that the dismissal and neglect of legal realism within Anglo-American 
jurisprudence can be attributed to Hart’s devastating critique in Chapter VII of The 
Concept of Law
24
 which rendered ‘realism a philosophical joke in the English-
speaking world’.25  Yet Hart, along with other legal philosophers, came to 
acknowledge
26
 that they had misread the realists as offering a form of conceptual 
analysis, that is addressing the ‘what is law’ question.27  Leiter argues that the 
problem for legal realists is that of historicism.  Legal realism came of an intellectual 
age in the heyday of positivism, the 1920’s and 1930’s, only to be dismissed in the 
1950’s and 1960s when naturalism became the dominant approach.  According to 
Leiter, the American legal realists were philosophical naturalists who sought to 
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address issues of adjudication rather than the ‘what is law’ question.28  The naturalist 
approach is not that of reflective contemplation of a phenomenon but seeks to subject 
the phenomenon to scientific inquiry.  Accordingly, how judges reach a decision 
represents a phenomenon that merits scientific enquiry just as much as how judges 
ought to arrive at a decision.
29
  In many ways, Leiter provides the theoretical premise 
for legal realism that the realists sought to abandon along with the methodological 
parameters that Posner identified as being nonexistent. 
 
Scientific Realism  
 
Simplistically, scientific realism represents an approach to the interpretation of 
scientific theories and the perceptions or understandings relating to theoretical terms 
and claims.  Scientific realists hold that there are objective facts which exist 
independent of any conceptual or theoretical framework.  These facts do not have to 
be observed, in order for them to represent truth, but represent truths by virtue of their 
acknowledged existence which are determined by common sense and good reason.  
For example, a student will regard a recommended textbook as representing the truth 
even though the explanations and knowledge contained within the text book have not 
been observed or even tested by the student.  Common sense and good reason justify 
the student’s belief in the validity of the text book, after all, a lecturer would not 
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recommend a poor or inappropriate text book.  In essence, scientific realism seeks to 
answer the question of how the success of science is to be explained without recourse 
to scientific method, that is by challenging the fallibility of scientific methods or the 
approximation of scientific knowledge.   
It is acknowledged that there are many schools of scientific realism, such as 
naïve, critical, entity, truth, etc..  For the purposes of this paper it is not proposed to 
favour any particular form of scientific realism but to consider realism in terms of the 
construction of scientific theory.  The justification for this approach being that the aim 
of this paper is to consider realism in the context of theory construction within public 
law rather than the validity or merit of any particular form of realism, be it scientific, 
legal or otherwise. 
Within science there are numerous approaches to theory construction, namely 
instrumentalism, descriptivism, constructive and empiricism.  Scientific realism 
represents an alternative to these approaches as its essence is that all scientific 
statements in scientific theories possess both truth and value.  It is an approach that 
developed largely as a reaction to logical positivism where the essence of analysis is 
that of the distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms.  Theoretical 
terms, unlike that of observational terms, are capable of semantic analysis in both 
their observational and logical form whereas observational terms represent 
observations and nothing else.  There are however a number of problems with logical 
positivism which scientific realism sought to challenge. 
For logical positivists the essence of scientific theory is the search for 
objectivity as the premise for explanation and description.  The difficulty is in 
defining, identifying and even contextualising objectivity whether it be in terms of 
method, observation, semantics, theory or any other form.  For scientific realists such 
 13 
a search for purity is unnecessary as theories are not just attempted explanations and 
descriptions of reality but go beyond that of directly observable entities to postulate 
theoretical entities which can result in predictions which are in themselves testable by 
observation.  Scientific realism allows for the development of science by facilitating 
the construction of theory premised upon another theory whilst the approach of 
positivists inhibits such progression.  Accordingly, the approach of scientific realism 
is one that accords with a key characteristic of scientific analysis, that of its self-
correcting methodology.  As a community, scientists attempt to solve cognitive 
problems by proposing hypothesis or constructing theories which are then tested by 
way of experimentation and observation.  The published results are then examined by 
other scientists who can ignore them or choose to incorporate the material, either 
positively or negatively within their own research.  Scientists do not test every facet 
which is incorporated within their analysis but accept that some analysis represents 
fundamental truths or background knowledge, such as the theories of evolution and 
gravity.  
There are, of course, criticisms and critical alternatives to scientific realism.  
Critics of scientific realism argue that it is mistaken in that it does not matter which 
definition of truth is used as the outcome will always be the same.
30
  For example, a 
theory might provide a complete explanation of the whole truth of a particular 
phenomenon, but the theory could be applied to both the observed and unobserved, 
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the real and the unreal.
31
  A critical alternative offered by social constructivists is that 
entities can exist in the same domain but are mind dependent in that they cannot exist 
beyond or without our construction of them, in other words truths are not discovered 
but are invented or constructed through organised social behaviour.
32
  Anti-realists 
deny that scientific theories refer to mind-independent unobservable entities.  Instead, 
nothing exists outside of the mind and therefore theories should always be regarded as 
not representing the truth.
33
 
Interestingly, just as legal realism has recently been re-evaluated so has 
scientific realism.  Giere develops a version of realism arguing that scientific 
representations are like colours in that they only capture parts of reality.
34
  
Furthermore, these perspectives of reality represent only bits of the world and will 
contain individual concepts and relationships inspired by religion or gendered 
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  For Giere, currently accepted scientific theories embody cultural values, a 
facet which inhibits their representational virtue.
36
   
 
Similarities between Legal Realism and Scientific Realism 
 
On the face of it, legal realism and scientific realism represent two very divergent 
forms of analysis yet it is possible to identify a rationale from which to test realism in 
public law along a number of notions for testing. 
 
The Rationale for Testing  
 
The rational for the testing of realism within public law analysis can be found in the 
works of Leiter and Giere.  Leiter’s re-evaluation of the legal realists provided a 
theoretical framework from which to test a body of analysis that was generally 
regarded as being atheoretical in nature.  Conversely, the works of Loughlin, Walker 
and Allan already possesses a theoretical framework albeit one that is individuated 
rather than representing a collective approach to the theory of constitutionalism.  The 
theoretical dimension is internal to public law indicating that there is an absence of an 
external dimension from which to test realism.  It is this external dimension that 
Leiter brought to legal realism.  This then raises the question, could not naturalism be 
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used to test the works of Walker, Loughlin and Allan?  It is suggested that it could 
not.  
At the heart of naturalism is the requirement that phenomenon must be 
amenable to empirical inquiry.  It is a philosophical theory that seeks to draw on 
scientific methodologies and it this feature which makes the theory amenable to legal 
realism.  As Leiter argues, the legal realists were essentially offering a descriptive 
theory of adjudication, that it is what judges really do when they decide cases.
37
  The 
theory of constitutionalism is not a theory of adjudication.  It is also not a descriptive 
theory although it may possess descriptive elements and finally, it is not a 
phenomenon that lends itself to empirical inquiry although facets of it could be 
empirically tested.  For these reasons constitutionalism is not amenable to naturalism.  
So, whilst it may not be feasible to adopt Lieter’s choice of theory it may be possible 
to adopt his approach, that of deploying a scientific paradigm for the testing of 
realism within public law. 
Giere’s analysis discussed above indicated that it was possible to view the 
world through the spectrum of colours.
38
  The spectrum of colours that human beings 
can see possesses a definitive structure known as the ‘hue circle’.  The hue circle is a 
contained circle which incorporates the four unitary hues of red, green, blue and 
yellow but also accommodates variations of these unitary hues in terms of intensity 
and brightness.  The fact that the model is circular rather than linear means that there 
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38
  R.N. Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), pages 17-18. 
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is no simple or direct linear relationship between colour and wavelength.
39
  In other 
words, the circular model facilitates a connection of variations that are excluded along 
with variations that a linear model could never achieve.  Not only can connections be 
made with neighbouring colours there is the potential to connect within colour 
variations that are diametrically opposed.  Giere also argues that a further advantage 
of the model is that it allows for perspectivism, the inclusion of colour subjectivism 
and colour objectivism.
40
  The spectrum, for example, not only takes into account the 
variations of the human visual system, such as the objective facets of colour but also 
subjective variations of colours, such as those induced by synthesis.
41
  It also allows 
for comparison beyond the human.  Just as humans have a colour perspective of the 
world, so do cats, dogs, fish, monkeys and birds.
42
  These perspectives are different 
for a variety of reasons but still represent a coloured perspective and one that can be 
used to learn about differing perspectives.
43
  Could not the varying works of Walker, 
Loughlin and Allan be represented as varying points on the spectrum of 
constitutionalism with each theorist capturing a particular facet of reality? 
                                                 
39
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The Basis of Testing  
 
Whilst difference, in terms of legal realism and scientific realism, provided the 
rationale for testing, it is the similarities that will provide the basis for the testing of 
realism in public law. 
Firstly, both forms of realism indicate that within law and science there exists 
a ‘local belief system’.  Beliefs are local in that both law and science possess views of 
their own domain.  These beliefs are also systematic in that each domain determines 
the legitimate methods by which knowledge can be acquired within each realm.
44
  For 
example, within law the common law system represents a fundamental method by 
which knowledge is acquired, developed and explained.   
Secondly realism, be it legal or scientific, indicates that each belief system 
possesses its own boundaries within which knowledge exists and can be acquired.  
Sometimes the beliefs of each local system can be shared with other domains, such as 
philosophy or political theory, but there is also the potential for conflict, for example, 
religion or sociology.  Ultimately this suggests that the boundaries of each system are 
flexible, porous and possibly even flawed.  This challenge stems from the perception 
that there are unexplained or unincorporated facets which are currently excluded from 
the established boundaries of analysis yet these facets are essential for the 
development of analysis.  Without this material analysis may advance but such 
advancement will ultimately be inhibited by virtue of the self-defined boundaries.  As 
scientific realists assert, without the unchallenged acceptance of some forms of 
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scientific understanding, such as Newtonian mechanics, how else could man land on 
the moon. 
Thirdly, the essence of the challenge for realists, both legal and scientific, is 
the exclusion of essential facts for the development of their analysis, that is ‘common 
sense’.  Common sense is never completely defined but is represented as indicating 
materials which, on the face of it, merit inclusion because of their prima facie 
practicalness.  In other words, rather than looking at the world through the court room 
or the microscope the world should be gazed upon outside of these mediums.  
Finally, the above similarities indicate that there are semantic, methodological and 
ontological similarities between legal realism and scientific realisms.  Accordingly, it 
is proposed to focus on these three facets when critiquing realism in respect of the 
public lawyers, works of Walker, Loughlin and Allan.   
 




Simplistically, ontological considerations relate to the nature of reality.  For legal 
realists the nature of legal reality is that it is unrealistic, too removed from actuality, 
whilst for scientific realists the issue is that of testing for reality, determining which 
entities represent reality and which do not.  In ontological terms both legal realists and 
scientific realists are concerned with the determinacy of reality.  Where they may 
differ is on where to look for reality, a matter of methodology.  A concern with the 
determinacy of reality is a facet that can found in the works of the theorists. 
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For Loughlin the determinability of realism within public law centres upon his 
understanding of the notions of the state and power.  The state is represented as being 
composed of staatsgebeit, staatsgewalt, and staatsvolk
45
 which ‘gives us access to the 
nature of modern political reality and provides the key to understanding public law’.46  
In respect of power the focus of analysis is the relationship between the constituent 
authority and constituted power.
47
  This understanding of the individual state is 
replicated throughout the entire world which is now divided into an assortment of 
sovereign states.
48
 The internal functioning of these states, and the relationship 
between authority and power that they contain, is governed by the pure theory of 
public law,
49
 which understands public law as an ‘autonomous subject’50 made up of 
‘an assemblage of rules, principles, canons, maxims, customs, usages, and manners’ 51 
that condition and maintain the ‘activity of governing.’52 
                                                 
45
  M. Loughlin, ‘In Defence of Staatslehre’ (2009) 48(1) Der Staat 1-28 at 6. 
46
  M. Loughlin, ‘In Defence of Staatslehre’ (2009) 48(1) Der Staat 1-28 at 8. 
47
  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
page 160, precept 26. 
48
  M. Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), page 2. 
49
  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
Chapter 9 specifically outlines the precepts of the pure theory, though the book as a 
whole provides the necessary foundation for understanding the theory. 
50
  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
page 153. 
51
  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
page 132. 
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For Walker, the determinability of realism goes beyond that of the state and is 
to be found in multiple other sites of authority, at a variety of levels, all of which are 
plausible sites of authority to differing degrees.
53
  Walker also acknowledges a 
plurality of understandings of the idea of constitutionalism, and believes that a 
realistic appraisal of the present context must find some way of accommodating these 
many ‘frames’ of constitutionalism convincingly.54  This entails finding a place for 
statist constitutionalism, whilst simultaneously accommodating alternative 
conceptions which will require the traversing of not-insignificant linguistic 
obstacles.
55
   
Allan’s perceptions on the nature of reality is that it is based on the 
appropriately reconciled relationship between the courts and parliament as supreme 
law-making and law-defining bodies along with the resulting connections between the 
interpretation of statutes and their implementation within case law.
56
  According to 
                                                                                                                                           
52
  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
page 30. 
53
  N. Walker, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union' in N. Walker, Sovereignty 
in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), page 4. 
54
  Most recently outlined in N. Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ in P. 
Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), Chapter 14. 
55
  N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in 
J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
56
  T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), page 3.  
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Allan, only this constructivist interpretative approach allows a general rule’s 
application in a particular case to be ‘fitted into the complex tapestry of the law’57 and 
therefore provide an understanding of the nature of the entirety of law, and in 
particular public law’s constitutionalism.  Statutory changes to the fabric of 
constitutionalism can only find their true elaboration ‘within the wider legal order 
they seek to modify’.58  All public law constitutionalism must be understood, 
according to Allan, in light of the ‘enduring constitutional precept’59 of the rule of law 
and principles of justice, as enacted by the imagined ‘conscientious legislator’.60  For 
Allan constitutional reality is founded and resides solely in the common law tradition. 
Having identified the diverse ontological considerations of the theorists it is proposed 
to examine these in terms of the key features of legal realism and scientific realism as 
identified above, that of beliefs, boundaries and common sense.  Beliefs as to the 
determinacy of reality lie in terms of the notions essential for the development of 
analysis.  For Loughlin these are the abstract notions of the state and power, whilst for 
Walker it is the contextual non-statist organisations and multiple centres of power.   
For Allan it is the practicality of the common law but juxtaposed against theory, the 
rule of law.  Boundary in ontological terms is not so much what they are but a matter 
                                                 
57
  T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), page 14. 
58
  T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, 
Meaning and Authority’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 685-711 at 689. 
59
  T.R.S. Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, 
Meaning and Authority’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 685-711 at 690. 
60
  T.R.S. Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, 
Meaning and Authority’ (2004) 63(3) Cambridge Law Journal 685-711 at 690. 
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of what they are not.  For Loughlin, the true nature of public law and the theory of 
constitutionalism does not lie within law alone but must include aspects of the non-
legal.  The nature of the boundary is that it must not exist for reality to be seen.  The 
true issue is essentially a matter of methodology.  Although the choice of method can 
represent a form of ontological boundary in that the method used will place limits on 
the analysis.  For Walker, the true nature of constitutionalism is about extending the 
range of institutions and centres for decision making.  Like Loughlin, the matter of 
boundary is that it must not exist.  The core issue is one of structure, although the 
choice of structure, like that of methodology can also represent a form of boundary in 
that it will also place limits on the analysis.  For Allan, there is a clearly defined 
ontological boundary, that of law, although Allan does seek to widen the sources 
within that boundary to include not just case law but also theory, albeit legal theory.  
In some respects it is a matter of structure, akin to that of Walker, except that Allan’s 
structure is internally defined, a matter of depth as opposed to Walker’s search for 
external breadth.  In terms of the feature of common sense, for Loughlin this lies in 
the absurdity of not incorporating the political or historical.  Public law does not exist 
in a vacuum so how else can the true nature of the theory of public law be identified?  
For Walker common sense lies in the recognition of the contemporary world and the 
multitude of agents involved in governing, whilst for Allan common sense is to be 
found in the common law, the product of reasoned decision making. 
  
Methodological Considerations  
 
Methodology is about how information relating to a particular phenomenon is 
acquired.  For legal realists information about law is to be found by looking beyond 
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the decision making of the courts, particularly judge made incremental case law to 
consider how the law is applied in the actual world.  For scientific realists information 
is acquired by moving forward, testing new knowledge rather than retesting past 
knowledge.  There is an acceptance that theoretical entities of mature scientific 
theories really do exist and that the explanation offered by the theory in respect of 
phenomena are sufficiently accurate or truthful.  In terms of method both legal realists 
and scientific realists seek to ‘leave the past behind’ and look to the future which 
includes examining the external and even the peripheral.  
In respect of the theorists, Loughlin’s methodology is to draw upon the 
historical, political and philosophical.  It is suggested that the choice of method is a 
direct consequence of the theories that Loughlin seeks to promote, that of 
constitutionalism, but more particularly, a specific theory of public law.  Public law is 
a ‘young’ area of law when contrasted with contract or trusts.61  Loughlin’s concern, 
                                                 
61
  Constitutional issues have a ‘pedigree’ of scholarly study amongst historians as 
evidenced by the works of W. Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in its 
Origin and Development (1874-8); E.A. Freeman, The Growth of the English 
constitution form the earliest times (1876); T.B. Maccauly, History of England (1876) 
and H. Hallam, Constitutional History of England (1848).  These works are generally 
viewed as representing a ‘whig interpretation of history’ where there is an inevitable 
progression towards liberty culminating in democracy and a constitutional monarchy 
(See H. Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, 1931).  It is only in the late 
19
TH
 century that law professors with a specific interest in constitutional issues 
emerged, most notably, A.V. Dicey.  Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of 
the Constitution (1885) established constitutional issues as a legitimate area of interest 
to lawyers and not a subject exclusive to historians.  In contrast, contract and trusts, 
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and hence his choice of methodology, is the control of the exercise of political 
(public) power.  Given the absence, within the UK’s constitutional arrangements, of a 
definitive and structured framework, for the exercise of power, such as that of a state, 
Loughlin turns to the theory of constitutionalism as a possible explanation and a 
framework for his theory of public law.  The advantage of the theory of 
constitutionalism is that it does provide a normative and valuative basis from which to 
critique the exercise of power in a constitutional framework.  The disadvantage is that 
it is a theory which originates within the USA and is therefore premised on the 
existence of a written constitution.
62
  Its transition to the UK has not been immediate 
and has been the subject of much critique.
63
  Loughlin addresses this ‘problem’ of 
translation by way of his methodology.  He draws upon historical, political and 
philosophical paradigms within which facets of constitutionalism can be identified, in 
particular the need to define, limit and structure power, indicating a preference for 
                                                                                                                                           
have always represented legitimate areas of interest to lawyers.  The struggle here, 
and one relevant to others areas of law, was the establishment of academic credibility 
and legitimacy.  See D. Sugarman ‘Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the 
Making of the Textbook Tradition’ in W.L. Twining (ed.) Legal Theory and Common 
Law (Oxford: Blackwells, 1986) pages 26-61. 
62
  See L.A. Alexander, Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
63
  For example H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); P. Dobner and M. 
Loughlin (eds.) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
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republican constitutionalism rather than its liberal-legal counterpart.
64
  Once these 
paradigms are identified Loughlin proceeds to construct a theory of the state resulting 
in the ultimate construction, that of a theory of public law. 
Walker, until recently, focused his analysis on the ‘realties’ of the practical 
decision making of governments and governmental agencies.  Walker seeks to ground 
his analysis of constitutionalism and the state at the actual face of decision making.  It 
represents an effort to capture and construct the functioning of reality by fashioning 
an observation based theory of constitutionalism which encapsulates the complex 
workings of the global order.   
Allan adopts a similar methodology to that of Walker, albeit in a different 
form.  Allan also seeks to understand the operation of constitutionalism at the 
implementation and adjudicatory levels but does not consider the agents involved in 
such decision making, the outcomes that flow from these levels.  The focus is on the 
substantive aspects rather than the procedural concerns of Walker but ultimately their 
goals are the same, the moving forward of legal analysis rather than an explanation of 
where current legal analysis has come from. 
Having identified the diverse methodological approaches of the theorists it is 
proposed to examine these in terms of the key feature of legal realism and scientific 
realism as identified above, that of beliefs/premises, boundaries and common sense.  
All the theorists deploy their methodology from a particular belief or premise.  For 
Loughlin it is the premise that the present can only be understood by reference to the 
past, for Walker and Allan it is the flawed paradigms within which current analysis is 
                                                 
64
  M. Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation?’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin 
(eds.) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
pages 61 and 64-66. 
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conducted that must be challenged.  There are also methodological boundaries than 
can be identified.  For Loughlin the goal is to challenge the established 
methodological boundaries of public law by including the historical, political and 
philosophical.  Walker and Allan also seek to challenge boundaries but do so in 
differing ways.  For Walker the challenge is about widening boundaries in terms of 
the range of institutions involved in making decision of a constitutional nature but 
also a stretching the range of decisions that can be viewed as belonging to the 
constitutional order.
65
  Allan’s challenge relates to the re-ordering of existing 
methodological premises from which constitutional analysis is conducted.  Allan 
accepts that case law and theory are the correct premises for constitutional analysis, 
therefore the boundary remains intact.  Yet, instead of common law, in the form of 
judge made decision making, providing the sole basis for constitutional analysis, such 
decisions should be tempered in accordance with theory, in particular, the rule of law.   
In terms of methodology and boundary analysis it is interesting to note the 
consequences of such analysis.  For example, it could be argued that all three theorists 
attempt to move beyond the traditional two-dimensional analysis that dominates 
public law to construct three-dimensional models.  Loughlin’s three-dimensional 
model incorporates the traditional hierarchal structures but includes a re-evaluation of 
the notions of the state and sovereignty (the basis for the exercise of relational power) 
but expands his re-evaluation of this traditional two-dimensional model by 
incorporating a new, third dimension, that of the relationship of the present to the 
past.  For Walker, the traditional hierarchal structures remain but there is an 
                                                 
65
  N. Walker ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An 
Iterative Relationship’ (2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 206-233 at 223-
224. 
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expansion of the range of institutions to be included thereby creating a more diverse 
arrangement.  Such an expansion can be represented as being in terms of the breadth 
of material to be incorporated within any analysis of constitutionalism but it also 
represents an expansion in terms of time. For Loughlin, the dimension of time relates 
to looking to the past, for Walker it is about looking to the present with the 
presumption that it also represents the path for future analysis.  Ironically, the same 
pattern can be identified in respect of Allan although it yields different results.  There 
is hierarchy in terms of institutions along with breadth in terms of whether values or 
theory should form the basis of analysis.  The reordering of the relationship of theory 
and values does however represent the emergence of a third dimension, that of time.  
Judicial decision making does not exist in a vacuum and if public law analysis is to 
move forward it must recognise the relationship between theory and values. 
Common sense for Loughlin stems from the premise that the state is a key, 
unique and powerful institution within contemporary public law analysis.  Common 
sense therefore dictates that to understand how such power is exercised it is necessary 
to look to the past, in particular, the historical and political paradigms which provide 
the justifications and premises for the exercise of state authority.  For Walker, 
common sense relates to the need to expand the range of institutions and the range of 
their decision making.  The vacuum of current analysis relates to the present whilst 
for Loughlin the vacuum is that of the absence of inclusion of the past.  For Allan, 
common sense is just as practical as that of Loughlin and Walker but it is about the re-




Semantic considerations relate to the relationship between language and reality, that is 
meanings assigned to notions and terms used to explain reality and the style of 
construction.  In respect of legal realists, the challenge to the relationship between 
language and reality lies in their attack upon the use of case law, precedent, statutory 
interpretation, etc..  The use of such terms are a mere pretence to hide the factors 
which actually influence judicial decision making.  For example, if parties to a 
commercial transaction view that it is binding then it is irrelevant that such an 
agreement does not fit the traditional ‘black letter’ definition of a contract.66  For 
scientific realists, semantic considerations can be simplistically explained as the 
understanding that theories, models and concepts (the terms used to explain reality) 
are truthful.  The approach represents the converse of legal realists but there is a 
common feature, that of truthfulness.  It is just the path to truthfulness which differs. 
In terms of Walker, Loughlin and Allan it is possible to identify facets of truthfulness.  
For example, Walker’s early analysis on constitutionalism focused on the ‘range of 
different constitutional sites and processes configured in a heterarchical rather than a 
hierarchical pattern’.67  Walker later argues that the only way to construct a theory 
capable of comprehending the plurality of ‘constitutionalisms’ is to ‘proceed at a very 
high level of abstraction’, even a ‘rarified level’.68  He also notes that the problems of 
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  See K.N. Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step’ (1930) 30 
Columbia Law Review 431-465 at 438-43, 447-53. 
67
  N. Walker, 'The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism' (2002) 65(3) The Modern Law 
Review 317-359 at 317. 
68
  N. Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin 
(eds.) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
page 296. 
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translating linguistic meanings and contexts from one tradition of constitutionalism 
into another are not easily achieved
69
 but does suggest a rudimentary value-led 
framework for the translation.
70
  This has subsequently been complemented by an 
examination of the values of constitutionalism and democracy and their iterative 
relationship.
71
  Walker’s search for truthfulness entails a distillation of the meaning of 
constitutionalism at both state and non-state levels with a resulting compromise on the 
meanings of the core values of constitutionalism in order to achieve a consensus.  
Walker’s approach possesses similarity with that of the legal realists, the challenging 
of existing linguistic terminology in order to identify the truth, but the outcome is a 
reification of key notions and the construction of a theory of constitutionalism that 
could achieve the status of a scientific theory in terms of its truthfulness.  In terms of 
semantic considerations of realism, Walker’s approach combines elements of both 
legal and scientific realism. 
For Loughlin there is also a similar setting aside of existing terms and 
concepts but also the abandonment of established methodology.  The focus is on a 
critical re-evaluation or interpretation of key notions within public law, such as 
sovereignty and power but also the introduction of concepts that are unfamiliar in the 
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  N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in 
J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), page 32. 
70
  N. Walker, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in 
J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pages 45-52. 
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context of British public law.  Specifically, these are the ideas of public law as droit 
politique,
72
 a particular theory of state
73
 and the pure theory of public law.
74
  Loughlin 
is, however, keen to emphasise early on that public law is a ‘universal phenomenon’75 
and thus his discourse is not limited to a single state context.  As Walker noted in 
relation to his own work, the importation of alien notions from one discourse tradition 
to another is likely to result in either confusion, misinterpretation, or both.
76
  Loughlin 
himself admits that in the UK ‘we lack the vocabulary for distinguishing between law 
as an instrument of government (lex, la loi, das Gesetz) and law as an expression of 
the constitutive principles of right-ordering (ius, le droit, das Recht)’.77  Loughlin’s 
approach is therefore more in accordance with legal realist than scientific realists. 
Allan, in contrast to Walker and Loughlin, firmly retains the traditional language of 
public lawyers and constitutionalism.  Allan’s view is that all laws and legal theory 
must be understood within the framework of knowledge they hope to alter because ‘in 
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  The whole of the Foundations of Public Law is an explication of droit politique 
as the basis of public law. 
73
  Most succinctly encapsulated in M. Loughlin, ‘In Defence of Staatslehre’ 
(2009) 48(1) Der Staat 1-28 and expanded upon more broadly in M. Loughlin, 
Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), particularly in 
chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
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  M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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  M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), page 2. 
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  N. Walker ‘Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of translation’ in 
J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pages 41-42. 
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  M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pages 8-9. 
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the real world laws must be understood and applied in the context of existing tradition 
and reasonable assumption’.78  Allan’s approach certainly does not accord with that of 
legal realists but it does possess some similarity with that of scientific realism in that 
there is an acceptance of the truthfulness of the current language of law, that of case 
law. 
Again, it is proposed to examine approaches of the theorists in terms of 
beliefs/premises, boundaries and common sense.  The premises from which Loughlin 
and Walker begin their analysis is that the current language of public law and 
constitutionalism is inadequate.
79
  For Loughlin this results in the re-interpretation of 
some exiting concepts and the inclusion of concepts that are unfamiliar.  Walker 
accepts existing definitions but seeks to widen their scope.  Inherent within both 
approaches is the assumption that meanings, which exist within one realm, can be 
transferred to another.  Allan’s analysis is premised on the acceptance of existing 
terminology.  In terms of realistic analysis and premise/belief, the approach of Walker 
and Loughlin accords more with that of legal realists whist Allan’s favours that of 
scientific realism, the acceptance of the truthfulness of existing terms.  In terms of 
boundary analysis it can be argued that Loughlin’s approach is the most challenging 
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  T.R.S. Allan, ‘The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual 
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  See this continuing in N. Walker ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of 
Democracy: An Iterative Relationship’ (2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 
206-233 and M. Loughlin ‘What is Constitutionalisation’ in P. Dobner and M. 
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and original whilst Walker and Allan are content with the boundaries of exiting 
terminology.  Their challenges to the semantics of constitutionalism are, however, 
quite different.  Walker seeks breadth in terms of existing terminology, the range of 
institutions, whilst Allan seeks depth, the use of theory.  Allan does not acknowledge 
or accept that there is a definitional or conceptual crisis in terms of the theory of 
constitutionalism.  There are, of course advantages to Allan’s approach in that by 
viewing the debate on constitutionalism as a matter of ‘locality’, that is the existing 
parameters of public law analysis.  Allan does not need to consider or critique the 
conceptual and global hurdles that Loughlin and Walker seek to address.  The 
disadvantage is that of the extent or degree of the truthfulness of Allan analysis.  The 
presumption is that the existing parameters of analysis, that of the common law, 
represents the truth but the reality of such truthfulness needs to be accentuated by the 
incorporation of theory.  This would indicate that the premise from which Allan’s 
analysis commences represents the truth but semantic considerations require it to be 
accentuated so that its actual truthfulness can be recognised. 
Finally, the notion of common sense can be found in respect of all the 
theorists.  For Loughlin, if current notions are inadequate then it represents common 
sense to re-define or re-interpret or include new notions to explain reality.  This 
approach, it could be argued, stems from Loughlin’s functionalist origins and 
normative preferences.  For Walker and Allan, common sense is about the re-ordering 






The above exploration affirms and reinforces the diversity of analysis that the 
writings of Walker, Loughlin and Allan represent in terms of the theory of 
constitutionalism.  It is suggested that the arguments identified can be placed into two 
categories, that of the tangibility of realism and the configuration of realism. 
Walker and Allan argue that existing perceptions of constitutional governance are 
tangible, yet their perceptions of tangibility differ.  For Walker tangibility is premised 
on a multi-layered and multi-faceted perspective whilst for Allan, tangibility is 
premised on the common law which is manifested through established institutions of 
parliament, the courts but also theory, in particular, the rule of law.  Conversely, 
Loughlin asserts that current public law analysis is premised on intangibility, in 
particular, the inadequacy and inaccuracy of current public law analysis to evaluate 
the realities of contemporary constitutionalism.   
Such diverse approaches in respect of tangibility bring with them divergent 
approaches in terms of reconfiguration, that is how public law analysis in relation to 
the theory constitutionalism can be made to be real or more realistic.  Loughlin’s 
solution is that of historicism, to search through the past in order to explain the 
foundation for the present.  Conversely, Walker and Allan argue that reconfiguration 
relates to the present, that of widening the parameters of analysis in terms of the 
institutional or theoretical, which can be represented as that of breadth and depth.   
Accordingly, it can be concluded that no one particular analysis represents reality or 
is more real or less real than the any other analysis.  All that can be concluded is that 
there is difference but also similarity.  Such a conclusion could be represented as a 
non-conclusion except that it is a conclusion, which accords with Giere’s ‘hue circle’ 
model and its capacity to incorporate both individual and collective perceptions of 
reality.   
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The ‘Hue Circle’ and Reality in Public Law Analysis 
 
The example offered by Giere in order to demonstrate the facilitative nature of the 
‘hue circle’ is that of the rug.80  To the person with normal human vision they will see 
the rug in terms of the unitary hues of red, green blue and yellow along with its 
variations whilst the person who possesses partial colour vision or is colour blind will 
see the rug in a different way, omitting some colours or emphasising others.  The 
perspectives of those with partial colour vision or colour blindness are not wrong, nor 
are they conflicting, they are just different.  Even the perspective of the person with 
normal human vision is not real because it will omit the perspective of those who are 
colour blind or possess partial colour vision.  Giere argues that all such differences are 
compatible because they all draw upon the colours contained within the hue circle.  
They just do so in varying ways by drawing upon varieties of hue and brightness. 
Drawing upon Giere’s analysis it can be argued that the individual perceptions 
of Allan, Loughlin and Walker represent dissimilar visions of the theory of 
constitutionalism, akin to that of Giere’s analogy of the rug.  The existence of these 
varying perceptions does not indicate that one particular theorist is more real, true or 
false than another, just that they are different.  In other words difference is acceptable 
and does not undermine or invalidate alternative representations in terms of the theory 
of constitutionalism. 
There are a number of outcomes to be found in respect of adopting the hue 
circle model.  There is, for example, the identification of new and diverse ways of 
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examining the theory of constitutionalism, the constitutional arrangements of the UK 
and its wider setting in the global world.  Loughlin enables public lawyers to become 
familiar with the language and vocabulary of political theory and acquire an 
understanding of historical methodology.  Walker’s analysis provides the potential to 
incorporate the global and multifaceted layers of decision making.  When contrasted 
with such expansive contributions to the theory of constitutionalism Allan’s analysis 
may appear to be the most unimaginative, irrelevant or even the least dynamic.  Yet, it 
is argued, what Allan does offer may be the most significant in terms of the long term 
development of the theory of constitutionalism within public law and public law 
analysis in general.  Allan’s approach allows for introspection, that is, the ability to 
offer an internal examination and critique, albeit within prescriptive boundaries.  Such 




The goal of this paper was to offer an exploration of assertions of realism within 
public law analysis.  Given the extensiveness of such a remit it was proposed to focus 
exclusively upon three esteemed public lawyers, Walker, Loughlin and Allan and one 
particular area of public law analysis, that of constitutionalism.  The outcome of the 
paper is that no single representation by the theorists or the combined manifestation of 
their analysis reveals a conclusive or all-encompassing revelation of what represents 
‘reality’ within public law.  Ironically, this absence of a definitive conclusion has not 
prevented the construction of a perception of realism within public law analysis.  By 
deploying Giere’s model of perspectival realism onto constitutionalism it became 
possible to incorporate the analysis of all three theorists on an individual and 
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collective level.  This outcome has numerous consequences in terms of the theory of 
constitutionalism in particular and public law analysis in general.  
Firstly, the model allows for the accommodation of the depth and breadth of 
variations on constitutionalism identified in respect of the three theorists.  
Connections between the theorists can also be made more directly and readily.  
Secondly, the model does not allow for the dismissal or invalidation of assertions of 
realism by any of the theorists as the model accepts that all assertions of realism 
represent reality.  In terms of the three theorists this allows for the accommodation of 
all methodological, ontological and semantic differences identified above.  The 
attraction of such an approach is that differences do not represent unreality but are 
variations of reality.  Finally, the model allows for the further development of the 
theory of constitutionalism on one level but also public law analysis on another level.  
In terms of the theory of constitutionalism, there is the possibility to include material 
that does not currently appear, such as feminist critiques, material which may be 
viewed as being unrealistic.  Accordingly, if such a model can accommodate breadth 
and depth in one particular area of public law could it not be used within other areas 
of public law analysis?  
 
 
 
 
